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Abstract 
In traditional organizations, stretch goals - difficult and seemingly unattainable goals - 
have been much debated for their paradoxical effects. Recently, their use as a 
managerial instrument in IT-mediated crowds has increased. Using online 
crowdfunding on Kickstarter as an example, we investigate how the use of stretch goals 
influences project performance. Empirical results show that the use of stretch goals is 
associated with better project funding performance. Such positive effect is even stronger 
for projects with higher levels of community engagement. However, stretch goals are 
less effective in project categories where stretch goals are less novel. Our empirical 
results also reveal that the use of stretch goals significantly increases a project’s 
likelihood of delivery delay. These results shed light on the potential dark side of using 
stretch goals in IT-mediated crowds. 
Keywords:  Goal setting, stretch goals, IT-mediated crowds, motivation, crowdfunding, online 
community, engagement 
 
Introduction 
Internet has allowed information technology (IT) mediated crowds to emerge as a popular organizing 
form. By IT-mediated crowds, we refer to self-selected and self-managing groups leveraging digital 
platforms; these individuals are largely unconnected to each other, with weak-tie attachment to the 
common purpose (Haythornthwaite 2009). Such crowds have emerged as an organizing means to, for 
example, debug software (Spaeth et al. 2015), generate ideas  in innovation contests (Malhotra and 
Majchrzak 2014), mobilize political action (Wattal et al. 2010), and fund creative projects (Burtch et al. 
2013). 
Coordination of actions in crowds is challenging because crowd behaviors might not align with the 
intended goals. Many traditional motivation mechanisms, such as legitimate authority, peer pressure, 
social interaction, and strong incentives, are weak or absent in IT-mediated crowds. Perhaps surprisingly, 
stretch goals -– difficult and seemingly unattainable goals (Sitkin et al. 2011) –-have become a managerial 
instrument in crowd organizing. Stretch goals are widely used in digital activism and fundraising 
campaigns by individuals and for-profit/nonprofit organizations to solicit solutions/contributions from 
the broad public. For example, in the past decade, we have seen a number of colleges and universities run 
ambitious fundraising campaigns to solicit donations from stakeholders, including alumni, current 
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students and their families, local firms, and international corporations and organizations. On 
crowdfunding platforms, such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo, entrepreneurs use stretch goals to inspire the 
crowds to fund financially intensive, technologically sophisticated products, such as 3D printers, smart 
watches, and large-scale video games.2  
The use of stretch goals in crowd organizing may be surprising because consensus about the effect of 
stretch goals in traditional organizations has not been achieved (Sitkin et al. 2011). Goal-setting has been 
touted as the most effective managerial instrument in traditional groups and organizations (Locke and 
Latham 2002), but much debate still occurs over stretch goals (Kerr and LePelley 2013). On one hand, 
stretch goals are heralded as inspiring (Denning 2012). On the other hand, they are described as 
demotivating, as destroying intrinsic motivation, and as leading to excessive risk taking (Sherman 1995; 
Markovitz 2012).   
Nonetheless, IT-mediated crowds present an interesting context for studying stretch goals. In the 
traditional organization setting, the goal-setting theory has identified a number of contingency factors, 
such as legitimate authority, social interaction, and rewards that can positively impact goal effectiveness 
(Locke et al. 1988). But with stretch goals, these factors can also lead to strong coercive and social 
pressures and can drive out intrinsic motivation, giving rise to the negative effects of stretch goals (Sitkin 
et al. 2011). In IT-mediated crowds, individuals self-select in becoming part of a project (Jameson et al. 
2013). This choice-based architecture may reduce the erosion of intrinsic motivation and the negative 
effects of these contingency factors.  
In this research, we aim to answer two fundamental questions: 1) Do stretch goals improve the crowd’s 
performance? 2) How do stretch goals interact with contingency factors in influencing the 
performance? Empirical results from the study of the Kickstarter platform show that the use of stretch 
goals is associated with better project funding performance. This positive effect is even stronger for 
projects with higher levels of community engagement. However, stretch goals are less effective in project 
categories where stretch goals are less novel. Our empirical results also reveal that the use of stretch goals 
significantly increases the likelihood of delivery delay for a project.  
This research makes several contributions. We extend the boundary of the goal-setting theory to flat, self-
organized IT-mediated crowds. To our knowledge, this is the first large-scale systematic study of goal 
setting and stretch goals in crowd-based organizing. The results provide insights into how stretch goals 
can be used strategically to influence crowd behaviors and also shed light on the dark side of stretch goals. 
The research also fills a gap in our knowledge about goals and online communities (Kraut et al. 2012). 
Although some research has shown how concrete and challenging goals increase contributions in online 
communities (Beenen et al. 2004; Ducheneau et al. 2007; Kraut et al. 2012), the literature has not 
examined how stretch goals, adjusted from initial goals, influence subsequent performance. Our research 
also provides insight into the role of community engagement and of goal novelty in moderating the effects 
of stretch goals. 
Stretch Goals in Online Crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding is an emerging Internet fundraising mechanism for soliciting capital and feedback from an 
online crowd to support innovative projects. Crowdfunding platforms allow entrepreneurs to request 
funding for clearly specified projects from a large number of individual supporters (called “backers”). 
Financial gains are not the primary driver for backer contributions to donation/rewards-based 
crowdfunding projects. Instead, backers invest in these projects for future products, for certain forms of 
recognition, and to be part of the community (Burtch et al. 2013). Backers are motivated by a shared 
interest, passion, belief, or sense of identity.  
We study the performance effects of stretch goals in the context of online crowdfunding. Although we 
have seen an increasing interest in online crowdfunding as a research context for a variety of questions, 
most studies focus separately on backers (e.g., Burtch et al. 2013; Li and Duan 2014) or on project owners 
(e.g., Mollick 2014). This research takes a project as the unit of analysis and looks into how project 
performance is influenced by the interactions between backers and project owners. On crowdfunding 
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platforms, a project is the basic organizing mode around which a crowd is formed. In addition to 
providing funding support, backers of a project can also form an ad hoc community around the project 
and can post comments to express their enthusiasm or to improve the project. On major crowdfunding 
platforms, about 10% to 40% of projects successfully reach their funding goal. The amount of capital 
raised is very unpredictable, and the factors that affect funding success are still poorly understood. Even 
less understood is the delivery of the projects. In an early study of the Kickstarter platform, Mollick (2014) 
finds that more than 75% of the projects are delivered late. 
We focus on the goal-setting practice whereby project owners adjust their funding goal after their project 
has reached the initial funding goal. This practice is referred to as “stretch goals” on the Kickstarter 
platform.3 Project owners are able to “stretch” beyond the initial, official goal of the Kickstarter project 
and raise twice as much, or even ten times more, money.4 If the project has met its initial funding goal, 
additional funds are collected regardless of whether the stretch goals are met. “Stretch goals” on 
Kickstarter reveal two essential characteristics, unpredictability and difficulty, which have been 
considered as the two fundamental characteristics of stretch goals in the goal setting literature (e.g., Sitkin 
et al. 2011). After a project exploits lead users and reaches its initial funding goal, it becomes difficult to 
predict the size of followers who may contribute in the future. As stretch goals have become more 
common on crowdfunding platforms, concerns about whether successfully funded projects can meet their 
promised delivery dates are also on the rise.5 In this paper, we focus on two dimensions of project 
performance that are perhaps the most important measures of project performance in crowdfunding: 
funding performance and delivery performance. 
We theorize the effects of stretch goals on project performance based on goal-setting theory. The goal-
setting literature has focused primarily on how goals influence human behaviors and performance in 
traditional hierarchical organizations (see, e.g., Locke and Latham 2002). Stretch goals are defined as 
goals that are seemingly difficult to reach (Cyert and March 1963; Rousseau 1997; Sherman 1995; Sitkin et 
al. 2011). The literature has revealed the paradoxical effects of stretch goals: In some instances stretch 
goals may increase energy, stimulate novel and innovative thinking, and promote greater persistence in 
action (Argote and Greve 2007; Sitkin et al. 2011), whereas in other instances, these goals might hinder 
motivation or promote escalation on a failing course of action (Lee et al. 2015). We develop our 
hypotheses in the following sections. 
Stretch Goals and Funding Performance 
According to the goal-setting theory (Locke and Latham 2002), goals shape how people adjust 
aspirations. Difficult goals might create positive valence in backers when they perceive that the goal 
attainment is possible, given the progress so far. Difficult goals create negative valence if backers perceive 
that the goal is becoming less attainable. The positive valence increases energy, urgency, optimism, and 
persistence, which promote consistent commitment to improved performance. Negative valence decreases 
motivation and commitment. In this case, stretch goals can be demotivating, overwhelming, and 
disruptive (Locke and Latham 2013).  
In our empirical study of crowdfunding, we theorize that the energizing effect of stretch goals dominates 
the disruptive or demotivating effect for two reasons. First, Sitkin et al. (2011) argue that stretch goals are 
less disruptive when past performance is good. In crowdfunding, project owners reveal stretch goals after 
their project successfully reaches the initial funding goal. Stretch goals coming out at this time are 
perceived as signaling good project progress. These dynamic, contingent stretch goals are less likely to be 
demotivating and more likely to be motivating. Second, crowdfunding backers self-select, rather than 
                                                             
3 https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/creator+questions#faq_50035 
4 For example, one project owner we talked to set an initial funding goal of $75,000 (see 
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/jj1/axis360-modular-motion-control-for-cameras). This particular project 
owner was hesitant to use stretch goals because the additional information backers had to process further 
complicated the campaign). However, he also felt that the stretch goal would increase the crowd’s engagement on the 
project because of postings by the project owner and the backers. The project owner ultimately decided to try them, 
and he set the first stretch funding goal at $300,000 (4 times of the initial goal) and the second at $700,000 (about 
10 times of the initial goal). The project eventually raised more than $666,000. 
5 http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/18/technology/innovation/kickstarter-ship-delay/ 
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being assigned to support a crowdfunding project. Self-selection may increase self-satisfaction and 
positive experiences. This positivity and satisfaction are likely to sustain the critical intrinsic motivation of 
backers, reducing the negative effects of stretch goals on contribution behaviors. As a result, we 
hypothesize:  
      H1. The use of stretch goals increases a project’s funding performance. 
Goal-setting theory (Locke et al. 1988) also suggests that engagement can enhance aspirations and 
perceptions of progress toward goals. Engagement can increase intrinsic motivation (Ryan and Deci 
2000). Individuals feel a sense of satisfaction from their involvement in a group activity—that is, 
satisfaction beyond its instrumental value in the form of extrinsic rewards. In online community research, 
members interact with others to build emotional connection (Blanchard 2007, Bateman et al. 2011). In 
crowdfunding, backers of a project engage by providing feedback and comments to the project owner. 
Project owners post updates of funding progress to further engage with backers. We refer to the 
aggregated total of comments and announcements made by backers and a project owner for a particular 
project as community engagement. This community engagement is visible to anyone visiting the project 
pages. Backers see who else is backing the project and what other backers are thinking about the project. 
As backers experience the passion and confidence of other backers, they are less likely to perceive that the 
stretch goals are unattainable. Community engagement reveals the morale of the backers/potential 
backers. If morale is high, then backers are more likely to consider stretch goals to be motivating. 
However, if morale is low, stretch goals may be less motivating or even demotivating. 
The effect of community engagement can be particularly salient in contexts characterized by incomplete 
information (Dewan and Ramaprasad 2012; Duan et al. 2009; Gu et al. 2013). Most crowdfunding 
projects fall into this category because individual backers would have difficulty verifying the feasibility of 
the stretch goals. Observational learning and social influence can emerge in such crowds (Duan et al. 
2009; Koh and Fichman 2014). Backers decide whether to support the stretch goals based on the crowd’s 
wisdom. Thus, we hypothesize that the effect of stretch goals is stronger in the presence of higher 
community engagement. 
      H2. The effect of stretch goals on funding performance is larger (smaller) when community 
engagement is higher (lower). 
The novelty aspect of stretch goals might influence the effectiveness of the goals. By novelty, we refer to 
the infrequency of the use of stretch goals by project owners in a given project category. Sitkin et al. (2011) 
argue that when an organization lacks the knowledge or practices to address novelty, stretch goals can 
motivate a broad search to explore whether the means to achieve the goal exist or can be created. Brain 
researchers have found novelty-based intrinsic motivation with infrequently occurring objects or targets 
(Taffoni et al. 2014). Thus, the high novelty of stretch goals might enhance intrinsic motivation of project 
owners and backers to work toward the attainment of goals, whereas the common prevalence of stretch 
goals reduces such motivation. We hypothesize the moderating effect of novelty as follows: 
       H3. The effect of stretch goals is stronger (weaker) when fewer (more) projects in the same category 
have used them. 
Stretch Goals and Delivery Performance 
Goal-setting theory also argues that stretch goals can be double-edged swords (Locke and Latham 2013; 
Sitkin et al. 2011). Although stretch goals might improve team or organizational performance, they also 
can promote excessive risk taking and escalation of commitment. In crowdfunding, the use of stretch 
goals might help project owners solicit significantly more backer contributions. However, project owners 
and backers are likely to underestimate the pitfalls of overfunding when they are overtaken by their 
passion to reach stretch goals. Stretch goals can result in an over-commitment to funding performance, 
such that project owners and backers fail to account for the negative effects of stretch goals on delivery 
performance (Conlon and Garland 1993; Lee et al. 2015; Sleesman et al. 2012). Great success in funding 
potentially puts excess pressure on project owners’ limited production and fulfillment capacities. We 
hypothesize this potential dark side of stretch goals as follows: 
      H4: The use of stretch goals increases the likelihood of delivery delay. 
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Methodology 
Data Description 
Our empirical context is Kickstarter, one of the leading online crowdfunding platforms, with more than 
8.5 million backers. The crowdfunding platform provides rewards-based crowdfunding mechanisms 
through which project backers receive future products or certain types of recognition for their 
contribution. Before starting this quantitative research, we conducted a two-year, in-depth case study of a 
startup company that has run three campaigns on Kickstarter to fund the production of its products. The 
company used stretch goals in one of its three crowdfunding projects. 
The dataset for the research reported here was collected from Kickstarter in December 2014. It consists of 
a complete sample of 68,577 successfully funded projects, launched between May 2009 and September 
2014 and covering various categories, including film & photo (22%), music (18%), publishing (11%), 
games (7%), product design (6%), and technology (4%), etc. 
The use of stretch goals and product delivery information are announced as updates on the project pages. 
For each project, our computer program extracted the original funding goal, funding duration, the total 
amount of funding pledged, the number of backers, and the promised delivery date of project outputs. To 
validate that the computer program correctly extracted some unstructured data (i.e., whether a project 
used stretch goals and whether the project delivered late), we had three undergraduate research assistants 
read through project pages and manually code a validation sample of 1,800 projects. The computer-
extracted data are highly consistent with the manually coded data (matching in 93% of the projects).  
Construct Measures 
A project’s funding performance is measured by the ratio of the total amount of funding pledged and the 
original funding goal. By dividing by the original funding goal, this measure of funding performance 
controls the project heterogeneity and is particularly useful in studying the effect of stretch goals. A 
project’s delivery performance is coded as a binary variable, with the value equal to 1 if a project was 
unable to deliver project outputs by the promised delivery date.6 
Community engagement is operationalized as the number of comments posted (by the project owner and 
backers) on the project page. This aggregate measure captures the overall interactions among the project 
owner and backers. The popularity/novelty of stretch goals is measured by the percent of projects (within 
the same category) that use stretch goals. If a larger percent of projects in a category use stretch goals, the 
stretch goals novelty is lower in this category.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the key variables are presented in Table 1. In our data sample, about 17% of the 
projects have used stretch goals. Stretch goals (abbreviated as SG in the table) are most often used in the 
Games categories (used by more than 60% of projects) and are least used in the Music categories (used by 
less than 2% of projects). Levels of community engagement are quite heterogeneous for different projects. 
In addition, on average, a successful project receives 4.8 times its initial funding goal, and those projects 
with stretch goals receive over 13 times of their initial goal. About 52% of projects are not able to deliver 
project outputs by the promised delivery time. 
Empirical Analyses and Results 
We first conducted an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of LogFundingRatio on a set of 
explanatory variables to reveal how stretch goals and other factors influence a project’s funding 
performance. To address the potential endogeneity concern about project owners’ use of stretch goals, we 
                                                             
6 Alternatively, we can measure delivery performance as the number of days until the project outputs get delivered. In 
this way, we have a continuous measure of delivery delay. We do not use this approach to avoid the right censoring 
issue. As delivery delay can be substantial, we do not observe the actual delivery date for projects that had not long 
passed their promised delivery date. Therefore, it is difficult to quantity the extent of delay for these projects.  
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explored a set of instrumental variables and re-estimated the model using a two-step Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) approach. We then performed a Logistic regression of Delayed on a set of 
explanatory variables to study whether the use of stretch goals increases the likelihood of delivery delay. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Funding Ratio Ratio of the total amount of funding pledged to the original funding goal 4.75 220.50 1.00 41,536.01 
Initial Funding 
Goal 
The initial funding goal set by the 
project owner 8,715 31,761 0.01 2,000,000 
Funding Pledged Total amount of funding pledged 16,940 117,601 1 13,000,000 
Backers Count Total number of backers contributing to a project 
223.70 1,345.93 1 105,857 
Delayed 
Binary variable (1 if the project 
delivered rewards after the 
promised delivery date, and 0 
otherwise) 
0.46 0.50 0 1 
Has Stretch Goal Binary variable (1 if the project has stretch goals and 0 otherwise) 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Comments Count 
The number of comments and 
responses posted by backers and the 
project owner 
89.85 2053.26 0 347,736 
Stretch Goal 
Popularity/Novelty 
The percent of projects with stretch 
goals in a project category 0.10 0.13 0 0.63 
Rewards Count The number of rewards given to backers for their contributions 9.82 6.10 0 227 
Updates Count The number of updates posted by the project owner 10.10 12.21 0 301 
Duration Length of the funding cycle (in day) 32.96 12.53 1 91.96 
Note: The number of observations is 18,940 for the binary variable, Delayed, and 68,577 for other variables. When 
evaluating delivery performance, we used a subsample of projects with promised delivery dates prior to January 1, 
2014, and excluded projects after that date (i.e., projects without delivery information are excluded). This treatment 
mitigates the right-censoring issue. 
Effect of Stretch Goals on Project Performance 
Empirical results support the hypothesis (H1) that stretch goals have a positive effect on a project’s 
funding performance. The parameter estimate of HasSG shows that, on average, the use of stretch goals 
increases a project’s funding performance by about 12%. 
The results also support our hypothesis (H2) on community engagement. The parameter estimate of 
LogCommentsCount suggests that community engagement has a positive effect on a project’s funding 
performance. In addition, the parameter estimate of the interaction term, HasSG*LogCommentsCount, 
shows that community engagement further strengthens the effect of a stretch goal (i.e., the effect of 
stretch goals is larger when the level of community engagement is higher). 
Model estimates support our hypothesis (H3) on the positive moderating effect of stretch goals novelty on 
funding performance. The parameter estimate of SG*LogSGPercent shows that the effect of stretch goals 
is stronger in project categories where stretch goals were used less often. 
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Table 2. Parameter Estimates 
Funding Performance  
(DV: LogFundingRatio) 
Delivery Performance 
(DV: Delayed) 
 OLS GMM Logistic 
HasSG 
0.124*** 
(0.008) 
0.320***  
(0.037) HasSG 
0.353*** 
(0.042) 
LogCommentsCount 
0.100*** 
(0.002) 
0.109*** 
(0.003) LogCreatedCount 
0.126*** 
(0.026) 
HasSG*LogCommentsCount 
0.085*** 
(0.003) 
0.047*** 
(0.009) LogRewardsCount 
-0.103*** 
(0.037) 
LogSGPercent 
-0.063*** 
(0.003) 
0.052*** 
(0.003) LogFundingRatio 
-0.005 
(0.027) 
SG*LogSGPercent 
-0.087*** 
(0.006) 
-0.101*** 
(0.009) LogBackersCount 
0.478*** 
(0.016) 
LogRewardsCount 
-0.101*** 
(0.004) 
-0.116*** 
(0.006) Intercept 
-2.033***    
(0.093) 
LogCreatedCount 
0.142*** 
(0.003) 
0.142*** 
(0.005) LR chi2(6) 1646.82 
LogUpdatesCount 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) Prob > chi2 0.000 
LogDuration 
-0.086*** 
(0.005) 
-0.082*** 
(0.006)   
R2 0.275 0.271   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, and *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Potential Endogeneity and Instrument Variables 
As a robustness check, we addressed potential endogeneity issues with stretch goals. A project owner 
might choose to use stretch goals if doing so can increase funding performance. Self-selection bias 
(Heckman 1979) might occur if factors that affect the project owner’s decision to use stretch goals are not 
included in our model. We used instrumental variables and the GMM approach to address this 
endogeneity issue (Hansen 1982; Aral et al. 2012). We identified two instrumental variables: 1) total 
number of projects with stretch goals on Kickstarter, and (2) the number of projects a project owner had 
backed before she launched the project. These two variables measure a project owner’s exposure to the 
use of stretch goals and hence would be expected to affect the choice. We suspect that a project owner is 
more likely to use stretch goals if she observes that a large number of other projects have used them (as a 
result of awareness or peer influence). However, these two variables are less likely to be directly correlated 
with potential unobserved variables that might influence a specific project’s funding performance and 
thus can be used to address the potential endogeneity issue.   
We performed a series of weak identification tests (F test) and over-identification tests (Hansen’s J test).  
The F statistic is much larger than the recommended threshold of 10, suggesting that the instruments are 
not weak (i.e., the instruments are correlated with potential endogenous explanatory variables). 
Meanwhile, the results of the Hansen’s J test indicate that the null hypothesis of valid over-identification 
restrictions cannot be rejected (i.e., the model is not misspecified). GMM estimates of the model in the 
third column of Table 2 remain qualitatively unchanged, compared with the estimates of the original 
model in the second column. These estimates suggest that the endogeneity issues likely are not significant.   
Effect of Stretch Goals on Delivery Performance 
Our empirical results support our hypothesis (H4) that the use of stretch goals significantly increased the 
likelihood of delivery delay. The odds ratio is exp(0.353) = 1.423—that is, the odds of a delivery delay for 
 Goal Setting in IT-Mediated Crowds 
  
 Thirty Sixth International Conference on Information Systems, Fort Worth 2015 8 
projects with stretch goals are about 42% higher than the odds for projects without stretch goals. The 
significant increase in the likelihood of a delivery delay reveals the dark side of using stretch goals in 
crowdfunded projects. 
Discussion and Future Work 
Our theoretical framework and empirical results make several contributions. We extend the boundaries of 
goal-setting theory from traditional hierarchical organizations to IT-mediated crowds. Our results 
highlight the role of community engagement and the novelty of stretch goals. These results provide 
insights into how to use stretch goals to improve crowd performance. Project owners can increase the 
funding performance of their project with stretch goals. Such positive effects are even stronger for projects 
with higher levels of community engagement. However, stretch goals are less effective in project 
categories where they have been used more frequently and are thus more common. Our empirical results 
also reveal that the use of stretch goals significantly increases a project’s likelihood of delivery delay. 
Project owners, backers, and crowdfunding platform owners need to be aware of the potential dark side of 
using stretch goals. 
Future work will examine the extent of the delivery delay that results from the use of stretch goals. More 
granular analyses of stretch goals (e.g., the level of goal difficulty) and their effects on funding 
performance can be also carried out. There is also a need to incorporate more characteristics of the 
crowds to study how they influence project performance. With a richer dataset, future research will be 
able to capture dynamics of funding patterns and community engagement before and after the 
announcement of stretch goals. Future research may look into the effect of goal setting in other IT-
mediated crowds, such as Wikipedia, innovation contests, and open source software development. 
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